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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF rfHE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE LAND BOARD,
PlaintiIf- Respondent,
-vsSTATE DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 10154

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant has appealed from a decision of the District Court in the Third Judicial District, the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, finding that the State Land
Board was entitled to deposits of sand and gravel on certain
lands in eastern Utah, that the State Land Board had the
power to lease and dispose of the sand and gravel without
the consent of the State Department of Fish and Game,
and determining that Section 65-7-10, U.C.A. 1953, did
not limit the Land Board's power to lease or otherwise dispose of minerals in accordance with its otherwise recognized statutory powers.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent State Land Board filed suit in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against the State
Department of Fish and Game, claiming that certain sand
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and gravel deposits on a section of land in eastern Utah
were, by virtue of the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16, U. C.A.
1953, reserved to the State Land Board and under its control and management. Respondent sought a declaratory
judgment quieting its right, title, and interest in the sand
and gravel in and on the subject lands. The Department
of Fish and Game filed an answer, denying that the sand
and gravel in the subject lands were mineral, and by way of
affirmative defense, alleged that even if the sand and gravel
were mineral so as to be reserved to the State Land Board,
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game was required prior to lease or other lawful disposition. A motion
for summary judgment was filed by the respondent and
judgment entered in favor of the respondent and against
the appellant on the 23rd day of April, 1964.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the decision of the District Court
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts
as being a more correct statement of the evidence actually
before the District Court and the record on appeal and with
being in accord with the principle of law that the evidence
on appeal will be reviewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court's decision.
On July 19, 1926, the State Land Board sold the following described land: Section 32, Township 3 South, Range
25 East, S.L.M., Utah. The lands are situated in Uintah
County, and were sold to Henry H. Ruple of Vernal, Utah
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The Certificate of Sale contained
the following reservation :
"Reserving to the State of Utah, all coal and other
minerals, in the above lands, and to it, or persons
authorized by it the right to prospect for, mine and
remove coal and other minerals from the same, upon
compliance with the condition and subject to the limitations of Chapter 107, Session Laws 1919, as amended
Session Laws 1921."
Subsequently, on March 18, 1946, then Governor Herbert B. Maw issued a patent to Lilly Ruple, covering the
subject lands and containing the same reservation (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) . Subsequently, the lands were acquired and
are at the present time held by the appellant Utah State
Department of Fish and Game, subject to the reservations
contained in the original Certificate of Sale and patent,
and further subject to the statutory reservations of minerals
reserved in the sale of State lands, as provided under Section 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953 (R. 41).
On January 27, 1964, the Director of the Department
of Fish and Game advised the Land Board that it did not
consider the sand and gravel deposits on the subject lands
to be mineral, and that it did not consent to the issuance
of any lease on the subject lands (.Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
Subsequently the respondent filed the instant action, alleging that the sand and gravel deposits on the subject lands
were reserved by the Land Board at the time of the original
sale to Mr. Ruple. The Land Board contended that the
sand and gravel deposits were "minerals" within the statutory and patent reservations. In answer, the State Department of Fish and Game denied that the sand and gravel
deposits were minerals within the meaning of the reservations, and pled that even assuming they are, consent of the
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Department of Fish and Game to any disposition was necessary prior to leasing ( R. 5 ) .
At the time of hearing on motion for summary judgment, it was stipulated between the parties:
"MR. BOYCE: * * * that there are deposits of a geological substance on the plaintiff's lands known as sand
and gravel and these substances are in such quantity
and such quality as to be economically and commercially usable, and that they can be extracted from the
subject lands by normal processes of quarrying, which
is a normal means of recovery in the State of Utah.
"MR. DEWSNUP: I think that defendant would
stipulate essentially to that, but on such a proviso that
if the sand and gravel present on this particular property were located in an area where there would be a
very near use so that there would be no particular haul
as far as distance was concerned, it would be commercially feasible. But this I would deny, it would be feasible to haul these substances at great distance. But certainly if this land were located in Salt Lake County
the sand and gravel on it could be considered to be
commercially usable.
"MR. BOYCE: I would agree with that, but there are
limitations which are normally attendant to any process of removing sand and gravel, being their economic
marketing. I would merely ask the Court to take judicial knowledge of the economic population conditions
in the area where these lands are located." (R. 43, 44.)
Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, it is obvious
from the stipulation of the parties that the sand and gravel
deposits are present in commercial quantities on the subject lands, limited only by economic demand. However,
since it is obvious that the dispute between the Department
of Fish and Game and the State Land Board is over the
proposed disposition of the sand and gravel, a demand
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market for the product does obviously exist. Based upon
the above evidence, the trial court entered judgment for
the respondent as prayed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SAND AND GRAVEL DEPOSITS ON THE SUBJECT
LANDS ARE MINERALS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 65-115 AND 16, U.C.A. 1953, AND THE RESERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE AND PATENT
COVERED THE SUBJECT LANDS.

65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"All coal and other mineral deposited in lands belonging to the state of Utah are hereby reserved to the
state. Such deposits are reserved from sale, except on
a rental and royalty basis as provided by law, and the
purchaser of any lands belonging to the state shall
acquire no right, title or interest in or to such deposits,
but the rights of such purchaser shall be subject to the
reservation of all coal and other mineral deposits, and
to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law
providing for the state and persons authorized by it to
prospect or mine, and to remove such deposits, and to
occupy and use so much of the surface of said lands as
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident
to the mining and removal of such deposits therefrom;

***

"Salts and other minerals in the waters of navigable
lakes and streams are likewise reserved to the state and
shall be sold by the state land board only upon royalty
basis. * * *"

65-1-16, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"All applications to purchase, approved subsequent
to May 12 1919, shall be subject to a reservation to
the state of all coal and other mineral deposits in said
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lands, with the right to the state or persons authorized
by it to prospect for, mine and remove the same as provided by law, and all certificates of sale and all patents
issued therefor shall contain such reservation."
Both these sections were enacted prior to the time the
State Land Board made any disposition of the subject lands.
Laws of Utah, 1919, Ch. 107, § 1.
From the above sections it is clear that the Legislature
intended to reserve all mineral resource in State lands that
may be valuable. The support of the common schools was
best served by such a reservation. The fact that the Legislature has sought to mention salts of navigable lakes and
streams makes it rather obvious that the Legislature intended a broad definition of minerals, and since sand and
gravel when recoverable in commercial quantities clearly
fit into that category, the trial court's determination that
the sand and gravel in the subject lands was reserved is
clearly correct.
Further, in addition to the statutory limitations above
mentioned, the reservations placed in the patent and certificate of sale issued by the Land Board evidence an intent
to carry out the statutory mandate to its fullest extent.

Mineral
It is, of course, obvious that whether the sand and gravel
involved in this lawsuit is reserved to the Land Board or is
held by the Department of Fish and Game depends upon
what is encompassed by the term "mineral" as it is used in
65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, and the patent and certificate of sale reservations, which are obviously included
to implement the statute.
The question of what substances are mineral and what
substances are non-mineral has been treated by the Utah
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courts in a fairly definitive fashion. In Nephi Plaster and
.\fanufacturing Co. v. juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pac.
53 ( 1907), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that gypsum,
which bears geological similarities to sand gravel, is a mineral. The court ruled that mines and minerals were not
limited to subterranean excavations nor to metalliferous
deposits. The court cited with approval the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 ( 1903), where the Supreme
Court held that granite quarries were mineral in character.
It was argued in the Nephi Plaster case, which concerned
the taxability of certain substances, that the constitution
defining taxable minerals should be construed on the basis
of the ejusdem generis rule. The provision and statute in
question bore similarity to 65-1-16, U.C.A. 1953, which
was subsequently adopted in 1919. The court rejected the
contention that ejusdem generis was applicable, and indicated that the construction of the statute was such that the
Legislature could not have contemplated the application of
the ejusdem generis or other limiting rule. The court stated:

"* * * From the foregoing it thus seems clear to us
that where we find the terms 'mines and minerals' used
in grants or in reservations, in instruments of conveyance, in statutes or constitutions, under the modern
construction the former is not limited to mere subterranean excavations or workings, nor is the latter
limited to the metals or metalliferous deposits, whether
contained in veins that have well-defined walls or in
beds or deposits that are irregular and are found at or
near the surface or otherwise."
lnDeseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d
401 ( 1946) , this court considered the question of whether
salt in solution was a mineral. The court quoted from 36
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Am. Jur., Mines and Minerals, Section 4, and adopted the
accepted legal definition of minerals contained therein. The
court stated:
"***'Accordingly a number of authorities prefer
to define a "mineral" as any natural substance having
sufficient value to be mined, quarried, or extracted for
its own sake or its own specific use.' Under this definition it is apparent that the salt found in the waters of
Great Salt Lake because of its quantity is a 'mineral'
and is valuable for its own sake."
Further, the court stated:
"Under the Federal mining statutes and the rulings
of the courts, the word 'minerals' includes not only
such valuable metals as gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin,
copper, and iron, but also such varied substances as
agate, diamonds, coal, asphaltum, petroleum, natural
gas, shale, granite, limestone, marble, slate, feldspar,
fluor spar, building sand, gypsum, silica rock, paint
stone, borax, sulphur, alum, carbonate and nitrate of
soda, water, saline springs and deposits, etc."
It is apparent, therefore, that Utah precedent has
adopted the position that, if the substance under consideration is sufficiently valuable to be sought for its own
sake apart from the soil, the substance may be deemed
mineral. Accepting this well established definition as the
premise, it is apparent that sand and gravel is a mineral
within that definition.

Geological Evidence
Volume III, 1963, Minerals Yearbook, Area Reports,
page 1080, notes that in the year 1963 there was produced
in Utah sand and gravel of a value of $20,954,000. This
clearly evidences the fact that sand and gravel, when found
in sufficient quantity and quality to be commercially mar-
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ketable, satisfies the definition of mineral noted in the above
cases.
In i\lineral and Water Resources of Utah, Bulletin 73,
1964, published by the Utah Geological and Mineralogical
Survey, it is noted:
"Sand and gravel deposits consist of unconsolidated
rock fragments which have been moved and sorted by
natural processes so that most of the finer and very
coarse fragments have been separated from them.
Sand and gravel are widely used in the construction
industry because they provide strength, durability, and
bulk at low unit cost. Because they are so abundant,
so universally used, and relatively low priced, their
mineral resource value has not always been fully appreciated. * * *
"The large quantities of sand and gravel used in
the State reflect the abundant supply of high quality
material available to the consumer at low cost. Much
of the material can be used with minimum screening,
washing, and crushing; transportation costs are minimal because of the proximity of many source areas to
transportation facilities and to the principal users.

***
"The market for sand and gravel has progressively
expanded up to the present and will probably continue
to increase in the future, particularly in the expanding
urban areas. The resources of sand and gravel are
ample to supply the market in the foreseeable future.
Large construction projects, such as the Flaming
Gorge Dam, make large but temporary demands on
normally little developed deposits away from the large
urban areas. Much of the material in the eastern and
southern parts of the State is in presently inaccessible
canyons. Locally, some sand and gravel deposits are
becoming unavailable for use in some of the rapidly
expanding urban areas. In such areas, more expensive
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crushed rock, lightweight aggregate, or other materials
may partially supplant sand and gravel in the construction industry."
It is apparent from this that sand and gravel have a high
commercial value in Utah when it is found in sufficient
quantity and quality as to be commercially usable. Further,
it is apparent that valuable deposits of sand and gravel are
rather well defined in Utah and are certainly considered
mineral by geologists and mineralogists.
Further, it is well settled that sand and gravel in general
have a recognized industrial mineral worth. In Industrial
Minerals and Rocks, 3rd Ed., (Mudd Series), it is stated:
"Sand and gravel together constitute the mineral
raw materials of largest volume produced from the
earth. In 1958, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of
Mines, 680,080,000 tons of sand and gravel (including
industrial sand) were produced in the United States.
The nearest competitor was crushed rock of which
532,818,000 tons were produced. Coal, both bituminous and anthracite accounted for only 431,616,689
tons in the same year. In dollar value, sand and gravel
were exceeded only by cement, crushed rock and fuels.
Hence it is a major unit of the mineral-producing industry. As an example, one plant in California operates around the clock at an average rate of 1,500 tons
per hour, and at peak intervals has shipped over 4,000
tons per hour, all by trucks. Nevertheless, it is controlled by one man through a panel of push buttons
that control the crushing, screening, washing, grading,
stock piling, and reclaiming of the products."
Further, contrary to some opinions, it is apparent that
there are definitive geological specifications defining sand
and gravel, and that the industry has reached a rather
sophisticated standard of determining the value of sand
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and gravel deposits ancl identifying the length and depth of
sand and gravel beds. Industrial Minerals and Rocks, supra,

739, 741.
Further, geologists, although defining sand and gravel
as consisting of "continuously graded unconsolidated materials," clearly recognize that commercial sand and gravel
deposits are generally classified geologically into four categories, and have been able to define with substantial specificity the geological and mineralogical qualities of commercial sand and gravel, such that persons reasonably
acquainted with the substance have definite standards for
determining what in fact is sand and gravel as distinct from
worthless alluvium.
Further, there are definite recognized forms of mining,
quarrying, and dredging sand and gravel, and the processing and manufacturing involves sophisticated plant design
and processing. Industrial Minerals and Rocks, 745, 758.
See also Bates, Geology of the Industrial Rocks and Minerals, Ch. 5, p. 82 ( 1960) .
There is no question that sand and gravel have recognizable characteristics such that when found in sufficient
quantity to be commercially valuable, are clearly recognizable from other earth substances and from the soil itself.
Thus, in Mineral Facts and Problems, Bulletin 585, (Bureau of Mines 1960), p. 706, it is stated:
"~Iethods of formation and deposition have imparted physical characteristics to sands and gravels
that largely determine the commercial value for a particular use and influence the manner of exploitation.

* * *"
This same work supports the position that sand and
gravel is an identifiable geological mineral which has sub-
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stantial worth in commercial industry. It is further recognized that extracting processes are such that sand and
gravel is recoverable by recognized mining techniques.
Mineral Facts and Problems, supra, 706, 707.
Therefore, from what has been noted above as to the
geological and mineralogical aspects of sand and gravel, it
is apparent that this substance, when related to the judicial
test laid down in the Nephi Plaster and Deseret Livestock
cases, supra, is mineral, depending upon the quantity and
quality of the deposit. In the instant case it is stipulated
by the parties that the sand and gravel present upon the
subject lands is in such quantities and of such quality as to
be commercially minable and marketable. It is obvious,
therefore, that under any reasonable definition of mineral
- judicial, mineralogical, or industrial- the present deposits must be deemed mineral and hence encompassed
within the statutory reservation.
Opinion of Attorney General.
The appellant relies in part for its contention that sand
and gravel is not a mineral within the reservation provisions of 65-1-15 and 16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, on
an opinion of the Attorney General (55-088, Biennial Report 1956, page 166), wherein the Attorney General ruled
that sand and gravel was not mineral. It is submitted that
the appellant can take no comfort from this contention.
There is no evidence before the court that the Land Board
ever relied upon the opinion of the Attorney General in
advancing or relinquishing any claims to sand and gravel
deposits. To the contrary, the fact that the instant con...
troversy is before the court itself rebuts the contention that
the Land Board has followed the interpretation of the Attorney General. Consequently, there is no long history of
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administrative interpretation or legislative acquiescence
in such interpretation which would support a conclusion
that the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16 intended to exclude
sand and gravel from the definition of mineral.
Further, the opinion of the Attorney General, it is respectfully submitted, lacks any real substance. First, the
opinion did not consider a definition of the term "mineral"
nor did the opinion mention or consider the application of
theN ephi Plaster case, supra, or the Deseret Livestock case,
supra. The opinion cited cases not involving legislative
enactments but construction of reservation clauses in deeds.
It is obvious that there is a substantial difference between
the intention of the parties to a deed where they are dealing
with specific parcels of land and the intention of a legislature providing for a broad policy that would reserve the
mineral wealth of the state for the common schools. In the
latter case, no specific parcels of land were involved but
rather an intent to encompass the broadest form of the
definition of the term "mineral" so that the wealth existing
is state lands, which has worth separate and apart from the
agricultural uses of the land, shall be reserved for the common schools. It is submitted that it was the intention of the
Utah Legislature to define the term "mineral" as broad as
possible. This is evidenced by three factors in 65-1-15,
U.C.A. 1953. First, the term "salts" is used with reference
to other minerals, evidences a legislative awareness that
the term mineral is not limited to subterranean material or
metalliferous ores. Second, the language of 65-1-15 totally
prohibits the State from alienating its mineral interests, thus
evidencing an across-the-board policy applicable to all minerals. Third, the only area which the Legislature excepted
from the reservation of minerals to the State in any sale
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of lands was where the lands were "improved farm lands,"
thus indicating that where the primary purpose for acquisition of the land was agricultural and where the predominant use of the lands would be for farming, inconsistent
mineral uses should not be allowed. This indicates that the
Legislature intended that the term mineral be distinct from
agricultural, thus giving the term "mineral" the broadest
possible construction. Consequently, it is apparent that
there are several weaknesses to the above mentioned Attorney General's opinion.
It is noteworthy that subsequently, the Attorney General was asked to pass upon the question of whether clay
would be deemed to be reserved as a mineral within the
statutory reservations. In that opinion (56-07 5, Biennial
Report 1958, page 189) ,1 the Attorney General answered
in the affirmative and expressly mentioned both the Deseret
Livestock case and the Nephi Plaster case, and relied upon
at least one early decision of the Department of Interior
(Aldritt v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 25 L.D. 349).
The Attorney General concluded that since clay was valuable in its own right, apart from the agricultural and soil
usages, it would be deemed mineral within the definition of
mineral as adopted by prior Utah cases. Subsequently, the
Attorney General ruled that volcanic cinders were reserved
as minerals (57 -031, Biennial Report 1958, page 195) .
There is no rational basis for saying that if volcanic cinders
and clay are to be deemed minerals because they are valuable in their own right, defined sand and gravel deposits of
commercial worth, which are also valuable in their own
right, are not mineral. Consistency of definition, both legal
and mineralogical, requires a determination that sand and
1

This opinion was apparently written by a different assistant attorney general.
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gravel under such circumstances be classified as mineral.
Consequently, the subsequent opinions of the Attorney General and the very shallow reasoning of the first opinion
would seem to attest to the correctness of the trial court's
decision in the instant case and give no support to the appellant's position.
judicial Construction.
The cases which have considered the question of whether
sand and gravel is mineral within the terms of particular
statutes or deeds are in hopeless confusion. A great number of the cases turn on the particular intention of the parties as respects ( 1 ) particular land or ( 2 ) the purpose of the
initial conveyance. However, in 95 A.L.R.2d 846, it is
noted:

"It is the general rule that a conveyance or exception of 'minerals' in a deed, lease, or license includes
all mineral substances which can be taken from the
land, and that, in order to restrict the meaning of the
term, there must be qualifying words or language indicating that the parties contemplated something less
general than all substances legally cognizable as minerals. Either as an application of the above rule generally, or by way of a specific statement consistent with
it, the * * * cases support the viewpoint that the term
'mineral' or 'minerals,' as used in real-property instruments which have been judicially construed, includes
clay, sand, or gravel, at least in the absence of other
language indicative of a different intention."
Admittedly, there are cases to the contrary. However,
these cases are not helpful in the construction of the term
"mineral reservations" as respects the public domain.
Thus, the three cases relied upon by the Attorney General's
opinion, heretofore mentioned and cited by the appellant
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in its brief, do not involve questions of the construction of
statutory reservation clauses governing the public domain.
In Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 ( 1944 ),
the court rejected the contention that sand and gravel was
included within a mineral reservation. The reservation
reserved a "one fourth mineral royalty." The court felt that
the deed reserving the mineral royalty did not contemplate
that sand and gravel be covered. The court noted that oil
and gas was the usual substance in which a mineral royalty
was reserved. 2 The court quoted from a previous case which
had applied the ejusdem generis rule and determined that
sand and gravel was not a mineral as that term was contemplated by the parties. The case of State v. Hendrix, 196
Okla. 596, 167 P.2d 43 ( 1946), applied the Beck rule where
the reservation was "* * * in and to all of the oil, petroleum,
gas coal, asphalt and all other minerals of every kind or
character in and under, and that may be produced from
certain lands***." This case also involved a private-party
conveyance and the court in applying the ejusdem generis
rule of the Beck case excluded sand and gravel. It is apparent, therefore, that since the Nephi Plaster case rejected
the application of the ejusdem generis rule to the same
language as is used in 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, these
cases are not precedent to the instant problem. They involve the construction of specific deeds and specific parcels
of land and not the broad legislative policy of a state endeavoring to protect its mineral wealth for the use of the
common schools. The same is true in Farrell v. Sayre, 129
Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 ( 1954).
It is submitted that the better reasoned and more relevant cases and authorities have found sand and gravel to be
2

To this extent the court was notoriously naive as mineral royalties are usually
payable on any substance extracted under a mining contract.
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a mineral in situations comparable to this one. In 36 Am.
Jur., Mines and Minerals, Section 5, it is stated:
"Under the Federal mining statutes and the rulings
of the courts, the word 'minerals' includes not only such
valuable metals as gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin,
copper, and iron, but also such varied substances as
* * * fluorspar, building sand, gypsum, silica rock,
paint stone,***."
In 58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals, Section 2 ( 3), it is generally stated:

"In a broad sense, gravel and sand may be considered minerals; but in a commercial sense they may
or may not be minerals, according to the circumstances
under which the terms are used."
With respect to the quoted statement from Corpus Juris
Secundum, it should be borne in mind that it has been stipulated between the parties that the sand and gravel in deposit on the subject lands is of such a nature as to be commercially useable and profitable.
In Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S.W.2d
981, the court noted that sand and gravel, if it has sufficient
worth to be commercially marketable, would be deemed
mineral within the terms of a deed reserving minerals. In
Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Rr. Co., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 488,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly recognized the
definition of mineral as being "any inorganic substance
found in nature, having sufficient value, separated from its
situs as part of the earth, to be mined, quarried or dug for
its own sake or its own specific uses." This definition is similar to that adopted by the Utah cases. The court stated that
if common building sand 'vas of sufficient commercial value
to be mined in its own right, it would be deemed mineral
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but if the sand were merely an indistinguishable part of the
surface, having only limited and sporatic use, it would not
be deemed mineral. It was the position of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that the Legislature, in enacting the statute
which was in question, intended to protect the commercial
interests in the land, and whether sand or gravel would be
deemed mineral would be determined by the economic
aspect of the question. Thus, the Hendler case recognized
that sand and gravel could be mineral where it was present
in commercial quantity and quality.
In Matthews v. Department of Conservation, 355 Mich.
589, 96 N.W.2d 160, the Michigan Supreme Court concerned itself with a question very similar to that involved in
the instant case. The Michigan statute in question reserved
to the state all minerals. The Michigan Supreme Court
ruled that minerals would include metallic and nonmetallic
substances and that sand and gravel, being a nonmetallic
substance of substantial worth, would be deemed a mineral
within the reservation in the Michigan statute. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that the reservation would include sand and gravel even though the lands were sold for
agricultural purposes. The court felt that it was the intention of the legislature to reserve to the state all interests in
the land, mineral in character, having substantial value
a part from agricultural uses.
In Loney v. Scott, 57 Ore. 378, 112 Pac. 172 ( 1910), the
Oregon Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether
or not sand or gravel was a mineral within the meaning of
32 Stat. 388, allowing placer mining locations under the
federal mining laws governing the public domain. The
Oregon Supreme Court determined that sand and gravel
was a mineral. The court stated:
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"The question arises whether building sand is a
mineral, within the mineral laws of the United States.
The language of section 2329 is: 'Claims usually called
"placers," including all forms of deposits, excepting
veins of quartz, or other rock in place, shall be subject
to entry.' Plaintiffs' proof tends to show that building
sand is a valuable mineral, viz., worth 50 cents per
cubic yard, and is marketable in large quantities.
George Otis Smith, the director of the United States
Geological Survey, in volume 2 of his Report of the
Mineral Resources of the United States, for 1907, at
page 563, by a tabulated statement shows that more
than $5,000,000 worth of building sand had been produced in the United States in 1906, and as great a
value in 1907.
"In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S.
526, 534, 23 Sup. Ct. 365, 368 (47 L.Ed. 575), the
court, in discussing whether granite comes within the
term, 'mineral deposit,' says: 'The words, "valuable
mineral deposits" (as used in section 2319, U.S. Rev.
St. [U.S. Comp. St.1901, p.1424] should be construed
as including all lands chiefly valuable for other than
agricultural purposes, and particularly as including
nonmetallic substances [naming a list, and continuing]. We do not deem it necessary to attempt an exact
definition of the word "mineral lands" as used in the
act of July 2, 1864 [Act June 2, 1864, c. 217, 13 Stat.
365]. With our present light upon the subject it might
be difficult to do so. * * * Indeed, we are of the opinion
that this legislation consists with, rather than opposes,
the overwhelming weight of authority to the effect
that mineral lands include, not merely metalliferous
lands, but all such as are chiefly valuable for their
deposits of a mineral character, which are useful in the
arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture.' This
definition seems broad enough to include building
sand, and we are of the opinion that land more valuable for the building sand it contains than for agri-
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culture is subject to placer location, and is mineral
within the meaning of the United States mining
statutes."
A position similar to that of the State of Oregon was
taken in State v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219,89 Pac. 565 ( 1907),
by the Washington Supreme Court. The court expressly
rejected the contention that mineral should be limited to
commonly recognized metalliferous substances and noted
substantial early precedence indicating that paint stone,
building stone, gypsum, resin, guano, mica, etc. had been
determined to be mineral. Both the Oregon and Washington Supreme Courts were impressed with the broad definition of minerals adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526
( 1903). In that case, the United States Supreme Court
held that granite quarries were mineral in character and
that the lands where the granite was located would be
mineral lands within the meaning of the laws enacted by
Congress. In doing so, the court recognized that Congress
had greatly refined the definition of minerals from earlier
laws and felt that mineral included lands chiefly valuable
for stone and that metallic ores were not the limit of the
term mineral. The court stated:

"* * * Indeed, we are of the opinion that this legislation consists with, rather than opposes, the overwhelming weight of authority to the effect that mineral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but
all such as are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a
mineral character, which, are useful in the arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture."
In Puget Mill Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421,96 P.2d 571
( 1939), the Washington Supreme Court noted that the

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
term miner~ls, depending on its construction, could either
be limited to metallic substances or embrace sand and
gravel. See also LaRowe v. McGee, 171 Ga. 771, 156 S.E.
591; Tennessee Valley Authority v. Harris, 115 Fed. 2d 343
(5th Cir. 1940). In Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109
So. 2d 628 ( 1959), the Mississippi court ruled that the parties intended to include bentonite and other similar nonmetallic substances. Accord: Cole v. Berry, 245 Miss. 359,
147 So. 2d 306. In the United States v. Aitkin, 25 Philippines 7 ( 1913), the court ruled that sand and gravel and
clay could be deemed minerals as that term was used in
common instruments. The court said that whether the material was or was not mineral would be based upon its commercial uses and that if it was present in such quantity and
quality as to be commercially useable and identifiable in
such quantity as to distinguish it from the soil. If such circumstances existed sand and gravel could be deemed mineral. The court found that the clay was present in such
quantity, but that sand and gravel was not.
The Loney case, cited above, from Oregon is of substantial weight since it was decided prior to the time the mineral
reservation was enacted by the Utah Legislature. Further,
it considered the definition of mineral as the term was used
on the public domain. Equally important was the decision of Northern Pacific Ry. v. Soderberg, supra, where the
United States Supreme Court indicated that building stone
and other nonmetallic substances would be deemed mineral
as respects their use on the public domain.
In Bumpus v. United States~ 325 F.2d 264 (lOth Cir.
1963), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that
the word "mineral" does not have a definite meaning but
may be used in many senses and that the construction to be
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given to the term must depend upon the purposes sought or
the intention of the parties, as the case may be. In that
case, although the court ruled that gravel was not included
within a condemnation instrument, it did so by applying the
ejusdem generis rule, a rule not applicable to the instant
case by virtue of this court's decision in the Nephi Plaster
case.
In the recent case of United States v. Schaub, 163 U.S.
875 (DC Alaska, 1958), the court ruled that sand and
gravel was a mineral under the Mining Law of 1872 (30
U.S.C.A., Sec. 222), where the material was valuable for
commercial purposes. The court ruled that the defendants
had a valid mining location where the sand and gravel was
useable for commercial purposes although not of a particularly high value. The court adopted the general public
domain rule that "whatever is recognized as mineral by
standard authorities on the subject where the same is found
in quantities and quality to render the land*** more valuable" would be deemed mineral. The court stated:
"Although the sand and gravel located by the defendants may be of a coarse variety, there is nothing
explicit or implicit within the mining statutes requiring mineral deposits to be useful for special purposes.
Sand and gravel of the type sought to be located by the
defendants is relatively scarce in Alaska, and being
such, are items of value in themselves. Their property
characteristics are far more suitable for building purposes than the type to be found close to or on the coast,
due to chemical composition of coastal substances. In
this sense, the sand and gravel in question is of a superior type. There is no doubt that the land containing the sand and gravel was greatly appreciated in
value attributable to its presence. No reason can be
found to exist to warrant a distinguishing of gravel

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
from other deposits used for a similar purpose which
the Land Department has consistently upheld as being
within the purview of the Act of 1872. The statute
makes express reference to 'valuable mineral deposits.'
The use of such deposits and their demand are helpful
only so far as they determine valuation. Mineral deposits may be just as valuable for one purpose as
another, and because a deposit may be limited in its
use only for one purpose, there is no reason to deny
application of the Act of 1872 if the deposit is valuable and can be marketed at a profit. There is no dispute that the sand and gravel were chiefly valuable for
road building and concrete mix. But, if the lands containing these deposits were as valuable and yielded
profits comparable to lands containing high-grade
sand suitable for glass-making, and the latter would
come within the Act of 1872, no distinction can be
conceived that would justify a different result.
"At the time of the passage of the Act of 1872, a
great deal of the lands were unexplored. It would be
a far stretch of the imagination to assume that Congress intended to limit the mining laws only to those
minerals known to possess a great value at the time
the statute was enacted, where the express intent of
Congress was to develop the mining resources of the
United States, so as to give value to a greater number
of things in the promotion of manufacturing and the
arts. To stimulate the growth of our country, Congress encouraged mining activities, and in doing so,
intended that substances that can be taken from the
earth and marketed at a profit, be subjected to the
application of the mining laws.
"Therefore, under the mining laws in effect when
the entry herein was made, such entry was valid and
the government's claims should be denied."
It is apparent, therefore, that the better reasoned cases
and the cases applying the definition of mineral to the pub-
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lie domain have found sand and gravel to be included
within the definition of mineral where there was a commercial use to which the substance could be put.
Early decisions of the Department of Interior and the
courts supported the position that nonmetalliferous substances could be deemed sand and gravel. In W. H. Hooper,
1 L.D. 560, and H. P. Bennet, ]r., 3 L.D. 116 ( 1884), gravelly soil and granite was considered mineral within the purview of the Mining Act of 1872. In Freezer v. Sweeney,
8 Mont. 508, the position of the United States Land Department, as respects building stone and other nonmetalliferous deposits, was upheld. That position was confirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in Mullen v. United
States, 118 U.S. 271 ( 1886), and in Northern Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Soderberg, supra. Other decisions of the Land Department had recognized stone deposits as being mineral
within the mining locations laws. M cGlenn v. Wienbroeer,
15 L.D. 370 ( 1892); VanDoren v. Plested, 16 L.D. 508
(1893); Bennett v. Moll, 41 L.D. 584 (1912); Stephen E.
Day, ]r., et al., 50 L.D. 489 ( 1924). Consequently, at the
time of the passage of the Utah statute, the decisions of the
Federal Land Department regarding locatable minerals
on the public domain would seem to include sand and gravel
and other similar deposits. Further, the Oregon Supreme
Court, as respects the locatability of the sand and gravel,
had, in Loney v. Scott, supra, expressly ruled that sand and
gravel was a mineral. These opinions were certainly appreciated by knowledgeable members of the legal professions
acquainted with the laws of the public domain at the time
the Utah statute was passed. Certainly, therefore, there
must have been an intention to give the term "mineral" as
broad a construction as possible.
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Although in Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310, the
department had refused to recognize a mining claim based
upon building sand which was of questionable commercial
value, in Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714 ( 1929), the Secretary of Interior for the first time gave substantial consideration as to whether or not sand and gravel would be a mineral such that location could be made under the federal
mining laws. The secretary relying upon the definition of
the term mineral in Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 25 L.D. 233, which is the same as that in
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, supra, ruled that
sand and gravel would have to be deemed a mineral,
stating:
"* * * In these publications gravel and sand have
uniformly been classed as a mineral resource. They
are also included in the list of useful minerals (U.S.
Geological Survey Bulletins, Nos. 585, 910) and mineral supplies (U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin No.
666).
"From what has been stated there can be no question that gravel deposits are definitely classified as a
mineral product in trade and commerce and have a
pronounced and widespread economic value because
of the demand therefor in trade, manufacture, or in
the mechanical arts.

***
"* * * There is no logical reason in view of the latest
expressions of the department why, in the administration of the Federal mining laws, any discrimination
should be made between gravel and stones of other
kinds, which are used for practically the same or similar purposes, where the former as well as the latter
can be extracted, removed and marketed at a profit."
Consequently, it is apparent that in situation where the
public domain is involved, sand and gravel has been deemed
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to be a mineral and since the Legislature obviously intended
that state policy on its public domain would closely follow
that of the Federal Government, sand and gravel must be
deemed a mineral where present in commercial quantities
and thus reserved to the State under 65-1-15 and 16
'
U.C.A. 1953. See also United States v. Harris) 115 F.2d
343 (5th Cir. 1940); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Assn. v.
Garvey) 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
The appellant contends that since Congress by the Act of
July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U.S.C. 611, removed sand
and gravel, stone, pumice, etc., from the mining laws so far
as locations on the public domain is concerned, this evidenced a Congressional dissatisfaction with the decisions
of the Department of Interior and the courts. This argument is non sequitur. First, the original pronouncements
of the courts that sand and gravel, stone, etc., were minerals for locations under the mining laws were over 70 years
old when Congress made the change. Thus, a long history
of Congressional inaction in the face of administrative and
judicial interpretation rebuts any contention that Congress
had not intended those minerals to be included under the
Mining Act of 1872. Secondly, Congress did not state that
such substances were not mineral, but merely removed them
from location. Thus, in Opinion M-36417, February 15,
195 7, the Solicitor of the Department of Interior rendered
an opinion that Congress did not make a determination or
finding that sand and gravel, etc., was not mineral, but
rather merely removed the substances from location, since
locations of these substances for purposes other than commercial exploitation (recreational and otherwise) had created problems in the management of the public domain.
The Solicitor noted:
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"***The declaration that these materials shall not
be deemed to be 'valuable mineral deposits' is expressly
qualified by the words 'within the meaning of the
mining laws.' The obvious purpose of this declaration
was simply and solely to remove these minerals from
the operation of the mining laws which in terms includes 'all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States * * *' ( 30 U.S.C. sec. 22).
Congress has not said that such materials are not valuable mineral deposits within the meaning of the mining laws and all other laws, but has clearly and unequivocably limited the application of the definition
thus expressed. To arbitrarily ignore that limitation
and hold that Congress has thereby determined sand
and gravel not to be a mineral under any other law
would be to give the act an effect which is contrary
to its express provision.
"The position that a declaration by Congress that
a material is not thereafter to be locatable under the
mining laws is ipso facto a determination of its nonmineral character is further shown to be unwarranted
by the fact that Congress has heretofore removed a
number of minerals from the operation of the mining
laws, (although using different language to obtain that
result), without any such effect having been ascribed
to the legislation. Certainly it cannot be said that in
enacting the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 Congress
has determined coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium,
oil, oil shale, and gas to be non-mineral. The effect
of that act was to restrict the meaning of the phrase
'all valuable minerals' as used in the mining laws. In
removing sand and gravel from location under the
mining laws Congress could very well have provided
for its disposition under the Mineral Leasing Act
rather than the Materials Act, and such action would
obviously not be construed as a determination of its
non-mineral character. As a matter of fact, Congress might for one reason or another declare any
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mineral now subject to the mining laws not to be 'a
valuable mineral deposit' within the meaning of those
laws and otherwise provide for its disposition without
thereby determining its character as a 'mineral' one
way or another.
"* * * If these mineral materials in a given case
meet the standard definition for 'valuable minerals'
as applied to low-grade deposits they must be deemed
valuable and being minerals they are 'valuable minerals' even though they are no longer such within the
meaning of the mining law. See Solicitor's Opinion,
M-36379 (Oct. 3, 1956). The history of Public Law
167 bears this out since it clearly shows that the sole
purpose of this provision of the act was to remove these
'minerals' from the operation of the mining laws and
to provide otherwise for their disposal.
"If Congress has intended by Public Law 167 to
quit-claim to surface owners deposits of sand and
gravel theretofore reserved to the United States under
other laws, it is reasonable to assume that appropriate
language to effect that grant would have been included in the act. Since grants by the United States
are always construed most favorably to the interest of
the grantor, the existence of such a grant must clearly
appear. The only intent which can reasonably be
ascribed to the action taken by Congress is that it intended to transfer the disposition of deposits of sand
and gravel owned by the United States from one set
of laws to another. There is nothing in the act or in its
legislative history to indicate that by virtue of its operation the United States was to lose title to any deposits
of sand and gravel which it theretofore owned. Therefore, deposits of sand and gravel which were the property of the United States prior to enactment of Public
Law 167 continue to be so and can be disposed of
only in the manner directed by Congress."
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It is apparent, therefore, that the appellant can take no
comfort from the fact that in 1955 Congress for one reason
or another saw fit to amend the mining location laws respecting Federal public domain.
It is apparent from all the authorities from the various
disciplines that sand and gravel when present in commercially marketable quantities is a mineral and hence reserved
to the State under the provisions of 65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A.
1953.
Statutory Construction
The appellant in its brief argues that the Legislature
could not have intended sand and gravel to be a mineral
because in certain instances the extraction of sand and
gravel would destroy the surface use. This overlooks the
fact that many other forms of mineral extraction destroy
surface uses. Placer mining itself contemplates extracting
the mineral close to the surface by removing overburden or
otherwise using the surface. See Yuba Investment Company v. Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields, 184 Calif. 469, 194
Pac. 19; Trklja v. Keys, 49 Calif. App. 2d 24, 121 P.2d 54.
Thus, in Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 116 U.S. 687,
it was determined that placer mines by their nature involve
the attempt to extract mineral which is generally found in
the softer materials which cover the earth's surface and not
underneath the earth in veins or lodes. In Clipper Mining
Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, the court
noted:

"A 'placer location' is not a location of lodes or veins
underneath the surface, but is simply a claim of a tract
or parcel of ground for the sake of loose deposits of
mineral upon or near the surface. A lode or vein may
be known to exist at the time of the placer location
or not known until long after the patent therefore has
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been issued. There being no necessary connection between the placer and the vein, Congress * * * has provided that in an application for a placer patent the
applicant shall include any vein or lode of which he
has possession, and that if he does not make such inclusion the omission is to be taken as a conclusive
declaration that he has no right of possession of such
vein or lode. If, however, no vein or lode within the
placer claim is known to exist at the time the patent
is issued, then the patentee takes title to any which
may be subsequently discovered."
As was noted in U.S. v. Schaub, supra, holding sand and
gravel to be a mineral at the time of the passage of most of
the acts involving the public domain, including that reserving minerals to the State of Utah, not all the minerals in the
public domain were known nor was their particular value or
location specified by the Legislature. The intention was to
reserve all potential mineral wealth for use by the State.
The fact that surface lands may be interfered with is no
basis to preclude mineral development, since the surface
in all forms of mineral recovery activity is to a greater or
lesser extent impeded. Coal, when outcrops are close to the
surface, is mined by a stripping process which completely
destroys the surface and involves no tunnels or shafts. See
Meiners, Strip Mining Legislation, 3 Natural Resources
Journal, 442 ( 1964). Consequently, since the Legislature
provided for various forms of leases and mining locations,
65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, it is apparent that the term "mineral" has no relationship to its location; rather, it is deep
in the ground, near the surface, placer or lode.
At the time of the passage of the reservation provisions
(65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953), the Land Board noted
that pursuant to the reservations, several applications for
the purposes of prospecting and mining had been approved
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for coal, oil, gas and asphaltum. Further, the State was
deeply involved in the litigation in U.S. v. Sweet, 245 U.S.
643, and was desirous of obtaining maximum value from
mineral lands. See Reports of the State Board of Land
Commissioners of the State of Utah, 1908-1924, Twentieth
and Twenty-First Annual Reports, pages 7 through 11 ;
Biennial Report 1919 and 1920, pages 9 through 12.
Certainly where sand and gravel is so diffused in land
that it cannot be commercially extracted or produced, it
would not be deemed mineral. However, where it is in such
quantity and quality that it may be extracted for its own
sake and be produced in commercial quantities which are
usable and sellable, it would be incongruous not to hold that
sand and gravel was a mineral. It is submitted, therefore,
that the legislative intent and statutory construction support sand and gravel as being a mineral.
Although the State Department of Fish and Game may
have undertaken other activities for the surface, this only
demonstrates a failure of that agency to fully appreciate
the nature of the legal interest they held and to take sufficient steps before acquiring land to make certain that its
mineral development would not interfere with the projected
uses.
It is submitted that the decision of the trial court holding
that sand and gravel is a mineral within the provisions of
65-1-15 and 16, U.C.A. 1953, should be affirmed.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 65-7-10,
U.C.A. 1953, DID NOT REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME FOR THE MAKING
OF ANY MINERAL LEASE BY THE LAND BOARD WHERE
THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME DID NOT HOLD
THE INTEREST LEASED.

At the time of trial, the appellant contended that 65-710, U.C.A. 1953, required that before any mineral lease
could be let by the State Land Board, it would be necessary
that the Department of Fish and Game give its consent.
65-7-10 provides that mineral leases shall be made exclusively by the Land Board. It thereafter provides that the
Land Board should obtain the consent of the "state agency
using or holding such land." It is submitted that the intention of the Legislature in enacting that provision was to
govern the situation where a State agency owned a total fee,
but where the lands were sought to be leased for the mineral interest. Since the State Land Board has substantial
experience and special knowledge relating to the leasing of
mineral interests, any mineral lease would be made by the
State Land Board to insure that the lease was made in
accordance with the best interests of the State. However,
where the State agency did not have a complete fee, but
merely had surface title, it would not be holding or using
the mineral estate, and as a consequence, the State Land
Board would not have to obtain the consent of the other
State agency before leasing the mineral interests, the title to
which would be in the State Land Board.
Several things support this position. First, 65-7-10,
U.C.A. 1953, was enacted in 1955 (Laws of Utah 1955,
Chapter 128, Section 10). 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides that the State Land Board may issue leases for exploring and producing oil and gas or for prospecting and mining
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purposes "upon any portions of the unsold lands or mineral
interests of the state." This provision was re-enacted in
1959 after substantial change (Laws of Utah 1959, Chapter
132, Section 1). Consequently, it would appear that in
order to give harmony to both sections, 65-7-10 must be
construed as being applicable only to the case where the
Land Board does not own the mineral interest which is
sought to be leased. Further, 65-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The board may lease for prospecting and mining
purposes the deposits of coal or other mineral or minerals that may be in lands sold with a reservation of
mineral deposits, and may lease such deposits in unsold lands belonging to the state."
This provision would apply to the situation in the instant
case, since the State Land Board is the owner of the mineral interest, including the sand and gravel, which is mineral. Therefore, in order to construe the various provisions
in harmony, it is apparent that the consent of the holding
or using agency need only be obtained where the holding
and using agency is holding or using the estate sought to be
leased.
Further supporting this position is the fact that subsequent to the 1955 enactment of 65-7-10, U.C.A. 1953,
65-1-95, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted (Laws of Utah 1959,
Chapter 132, Section 11). This provision provides:
"All state agencies using or holding any state lands
or mineral interests shall forthwith furnish the state
land board, on forms to be provided by the board, a
statement of the consent or non-consent of such agency
to the issuance by the state land board of any oil and
gas lease under the terms of this act upon such lands
or mineral interests. * * *"
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This section is substantially more specific than 65-7-10,
thus supporting the conclusion that the Legislature did not
intend 65-7-10 to be applicable to mineral interests which
the State Land Board owned. If 65-7-10 were applicable
to such a situation, there would have been no need for the
enactment of 65-1-95, and further, 65-1-95 would not
have to have been so specifically drawn to cover the situation where State agencies were using or holding any "state
lands or mineral interests." The addition of the term "or
mineral interests" in 65-1-95 supports the conclusion that
65-7-10 did not apply to the case where the State agency
merely had the surface rights and the mineral interest was
owned by the Land Board.
There may be situations where it would be good land
management for the Land Board to consult with other
State agencies before issuing mineral leases (other than
those for oil and gas) for the mineral estate where the
surface is owned by another department. The trial court
recognized this in its Memorandum Decision, and stated:
"That the State Land Board has the right to the
sand and gravel without the consent of the State Department of Fish and Game. As a matter of courtesy,
however, the State Land Board should inform the Fish
and Game Department of its intention to go upon the
lands and remove the same."
However, whether this consultation should be made a
mandatory requirement is up to the Legislature, and it has
not as yet made itself specific in this regard. Indeed, there
are a number of reasons in opposition to a requirement that
the mineral interest be leased only with the consent of the
surface owner. The royalties derived from the leasing of
mineral interests are trust funds held for support of the
common schools. Duchesne County v. State Tax Commis-
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sion, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335. As a consequence, the
trustee owes a duty to use the corpus of the trust in such a
manner as will bring the maximum benefit to the beneficiary. By allowing other State departments to restrict the
trustee's power, the purpose of the grants under the Enabling Act (Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12, 28 Stat. 107, July
16, 1894, as implemented by 65-1-64, 65 and 67, U.C.A.
1953) would be violated.
Since the title to the mineral deposit of sand and gravel
on the subject lands is in the State Land Board, and 65-710, U.C.A. 1953, does not require the consent of the surface
agency where it does not own the mineral interest, the trial
court's ruling that the Land Board could lease the mineral
interest without consent of the Department of Fish and
Game should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the appellant's position as respects
sand and gravel being a mineral is not in harmony with the
intention of the Legislature in reserving mineral interests
to the State. Further, it is apparent that geologists, mineralogists, lawyers, and judges, as well as persons of industry, have long recognized sand and gravel to have a mineral
status when it is present in commercially usable quantities.
The broad reservation provisions of statutes relating to the
public domain in not referring to any specific lands and
attempting to provide for a broad policy which would have
prospective as well as present application, would be frustrated by such a narrow construction as the appellant urges
this court to adopt. It is submitted, therefore, the trial court
correctly determined that the sand and gravel deposits present in the subject lands were mineral and under the jurisdiction of the State Land Board.
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Further, it is obvious that the appellant's contention to
give unneeded authority to other State agencies over mineral and land interests in which they have no title cannot be
sustained. It is apparent that the trial court's decision
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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